Please, media and public, give me a break! Let’s abandon a bad standard…no, make that two bad standards…”Bad optics,” “Caesar’s Wife,” “Above suspicion,” “Conflicts of Interest”… and then there’s “buying access.”

 

What we don’t know:

1.    Whether there was any “pay to play” issue. Did Hillary Clinton act officially to change or keep any policy or practice under her purview because of a gift to the Clinton Foundation?

2.    Assuming something changed (or didn’t change but otherwise would have), did it result from the gift or prospect of a gift.

3.    Is anything that occurred, within the range of current political debate, a change that is in or contrary to the public interest.

The rest is confetti.  The rest is about how people “feel” about Hillary Clinton.*  Nothing about the standards above provides information about whether those feelings ought to change because of any action or inaction on her part.

“Bad optics” of the issue don’t matter as a sign of how a candidate might behave in office.  In the contested judgements about what is in “the public interest” there is nothing “definitive” of the truth. There simply are no “final truths” about any public policy, only clues about future behavior in office.

A confession:  Sometimes when looking at a picture of a dead rat, I just can’t shift perspectives to see the red rose in the middle, even when I’ve been told it is there.

“Optics” summarizes the problem; optics are only optics.  Optical illusions fascinate us all but they are illusions.

If “Caesar’s Wife” didn’t do anything outside the standards for a Roman “happy marriage,” he shouldn’t have divorced her.  (Note that the historical authority from this well-known phrase has a misogynistic character.  Nobody asks if Caesar should be “above suspicion.”)

“Above suspicion” isn’t even possible if an official does nothing.  Inaction is action in behalf of the status quo. There are always voices opposed to the status quo and suspicious of those who, by inaction or action, preserve it.

“Conflict of interests” is no standard either.  Many relationships appearing to be conflicts are actually congruencies of interests.  Not all agreements between people holding different interests in a topic are in conflict.

There is, despite protests from outside parties, no necessary conflict between appointing public representatives to a regulatory board and representatives of the interests regulated.  Indeed, if public representatives are not thoroughly versed in the details, large and small, of what they are regulating, representatives of that interest are essential to understanding the regulatory impact.

An example:  I really don’t want my credit card to be “cloned” when I use it in an ATM when I’m getting cash or on one of those devices on a merchant’s counter to make it easy to charge my purchases.  If it is, I’ll likely “scream bloody murder” while saying “somebody do something about this!”

I’ll add my voice to others wanting to see these devices made more secure and those who use them required to take security steps.  A board set up to determine what to do might rightly ask me to serve.  Given what I don’t know about technology and the ins-and-outs of banking electronically, it might rightly include a vendor of security products and a technology expert at a bank.  The one might be seeking business (probably is) and the bank might be seeking to limit costs and liabilities (probably is).  Without them, there is not likely to be any sensible solution reached.

Ideally, each side of the subject will learn from the other and together they will find ways to accommodate each other in a constructive result.  If the ideal is not met and the two sides find themselves at loggerheads there may be no result.  Sometime in the future, some group will find a workable solution if the problem persists.

An example of potential vs. perceived “conflict of interest” may be in order:  If a publicly supported charity has a building project and buys the supplies from a board member exclusively and without bidding, a first reaction may be that there is a conflict between the interests of the board member and the good of the organization.

Yet it is often the case that the board member has offered to provide the supplies to the charity at his cost, a gift of the profit that would be made by the lowest bidder if bids were taken.  That is a “congruency of interests,” although you won’t hear the term often (if ever, before reading this).  If a lawyer, accountant or other professional offers his or her free services to a charity, that is a gift and his retention represents no conflict.  Charitable organizations often seek out “congruencies of interests.”  They’re helpful.
“Networking,” something every career self-help book recommends as basic to success in any common endeavor and every politician knows is vital to his or her success, is the aggressive seeking of potential “conflicts of interest.”  Reaching out to those whose interests in a topic are congruent with one’s own may involve the discovery of other interests in conflict; people weigh their interests and perspectives as they decide whether to support or oppose any given request.  The old book How Yellow is Your Parachute points out that most jobs come through personal connections, not want-ads.

Just think:  How desirable is the “no-brainer?”  It is the chance to do a favor that costs one nothing but ingratiates the person requesting it.  Faced with a request, most of us are inclined to say “yes” if we can.

“Buying access,” the second standard to abandon:  What bothers us is the sense of “privileged access.”

It is a commonplace that “access” to officials and organizations can be “bought,” at least one way or another. The “currency” used to buy access is often the real “secret.”  There are many currencies in use; sometimes currencies are combined to fortify their appeal.

1.     Cash:  Straightforward gift of cash to an official, usually considered to be a matter of “corruption” in the law, does happen.  Cash to a re-election campaign fund is regulated “lightly,” to say the least, as is use of those funds.  Cash used to set up a fund to advertise for or against a candidate is another use of cash for access.
2.    Opportunities:  Investment opportunities, loans, stock tips (to be legal, these could not be “insider” tips but may come from very well-informed sources).
3.    Influence: “I’ll get X to do Y for you by putting in a good word.”  If X wouldn’t do what you want otherwise, and what you want is really important to you, this will likely buy the promisor and X future access.
4.    Friendship or at least familiarity:  An official has known someone favorably, or at least not unfavorably, for some time and knows of a connection to his or her cause that could be helpful.  A simple request for help is all that’s required.  If the request is granted, a sense of obligation to help the friend in the future, even if it is unspoken, is created.  Access was and remains a “given” of the relationship.  Note too that even the best funded of “cash” influence groups recruit former members of congress to lobby congress; they play upon friendships already established and interests already known to add value to “cash.”

5.    Common interest:  An official knows that another person shares his or her interest in a subject.  A request for help is made.  It is granted or not as the situation dictates.  Access in the future is likely to be easier.

None of these are different from transactions all of us make from time to time.

1.    We pay for things we want that are legal for us to want.  If we are caught paying for things that are illegal we will be punished, formally or informally.

2.    We find opportunities opened up for us by relationships we have.  Our trusted brother-in-law (not the other one) is close to a car dealer who will give us a good deal.

3.    A teacher offers to write us a recommendation to graduate school at a place where his old college roommate is dean.  A fellow student on the student council offers to put your name in nomination for an award.

4.    A friend or the guy whose locker is next to yours at the gym knows the manager of the gym and will put in a word for your son to be a life-guard this summer.

All of these create new paths of access.

From the moment they happen we know someone better and know whether or not we can go back to them; we also know we will take a call from them and, if we can, grant them a favor.

The real complaint with “access” to officials is our sense that “we, the people,” don’t have it because others have “bought” it.  

We are strangers to those who presume to serve us.  That’s often true; there are more people seeking access than can get it.  Public officials can’t meet with everyone who would like to meet with them.  Just try to meet with your congressperson if they don’t know you.  Or, consider the salesman who must make “cold calls.”  An intermediary or a gift would make the call “warmer” even if it were ultimately unsuccessful.

You may, by this time, think that my message is “move along here, nothing to see here.” I’m only saying one of those things: “move along” and look for more revealing standards than the ones mentioned here.

You cannot rely on those at the front of the crowd yelling “fire,” the media.  You cannot rely on politicians to “give it to you straight” even when they say they are.  You cannot expect that people will not choose the familiar over the unfamiliar, the old friend over the stranger approaching on the street.

“It’s on us!”  You (we) must really look – I would say that as a citizen we are obliged to look – to see if there is, in fact, a fire, not just smoke.  “Bad optics,” “Caesar’s Wife,” “Above suspicion,” “Conflicts of Interest”… and “buying access,” are almost always smoke. You may get burned or miss out on something good that could have happened if you had not run from the fire if you use these standards.

What you won’t get is the truth of the matter.

*BTW:  I don’t expect to change any minds about Hillary Clinton here.  Vote as you will.  I do hope I challenge people to look more carefully at the standards we use to evaluate people for high office as I think many of them are deceptive.

A Demonstration Of How The Director Of National Intelligence’s New Policy on Media Contacts With Intelligence Community Employees Would Work

“How We Read a NYTimes Story on Drone Strikes in Yemen” by Ryan Goodman & Sarah Knuckey, originally published on Just Security.

As usual, much of the work of the devil is in the details, pointed out here:

How We Read a NYTimes Story on Drone Strikes in Yemen

By Ryan Goodman and Sarah Knuckey
Wednesday, April 23, 2014 at 8:03 AM
110Print
In this post, we’re trying something new. Below, we present an almost line-by-line annotation of yesterday’s New York Times story on US and Yemeni military operations in Yemen. Among other things, the following is intended to identify legal implications of the news being reported, the significance of some of the revelations, and paths for further investigative reporting.

U.S. Drones and Yemeni Forces Kill Qaeda-Linked Fighters, Officials Say
By Eric Schmitt. Saeed Al Batati contributed reporting from Sana, Yemen, and Mark Mazzetti from Washington.
New York Times

WASHINGTON — American drones and Yemeni counterterrorism forces killed more than three dozen militants[1] linked to Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen over the weekend in one of the largest such attacks there in months[2], officials[3] from both countries said Monday.

[1] Note that the story leads with “militants” instead of “alleged militants.” Technically this difference is solved by the reference to “officials … said” at the end of the sentence. Still, the lede creates an initial impression that the individuals killed were indeed militants, rather than signalling to the reader that the issue might be contested. This kind of formulation — asserting militancy as fact, and later attributing those claims to officials — occurs frequently throughout this story. Given the anonymity of the official claims, repeated cases in which official claims have subsequently proven unreliable, the difficulty of determining “militancy,” and what is at stake in the categorization, the NYT could assist its readers by including more nuance in such coverage. In addition to signals such as “alleged,” some stories could place an initial reference to “militants” in scare quotes.

[2] It is a significant understatement to call this one of the largest attacks in “months.” If the reported casualties are accurate, the weekend strikes were one of the largest attacks in the history of US strikes in Yemen. Prior attacks resulting in such large numbers of deaths in a short amount of time include the July-August 2013 cluster of strikes (9 strikes, 31-49 estimated deaths), March 2012 strikes, and the December 2009 al-Majala strike.

[3] As is often the case in news pieces on US “targeted killings,” the bulk of the information in this story is sourced to unnamed “officials” from both Yemen and the United States. In this story, anonymous officials are cited frequently throughout; yet CIA, Pentagon, and White House spokespersons refused to comment or to comment specifically on these strikes.
At least three airstrikes were carried out against Qaeda fighters[4] in a convoy and in remote training camps in southern Yemen. They were militants who were planning to attack civilian and military facilities[5][6], government officials said in a statement.

[4] Note that the reference to “officials said” drops from sentences such as this one, and now terms like “Qaeda fighters” have neither that qualification nor a qualification like “alleged.”

[5] According to other news outlets — such as Reuters and Agence France-Presse – Yemeni official statements included the fact that these facilities were in Bayda province. This is important because it would suggest the militants were not directly threatening US persons. (And President Obama’s new rules of May 23, 2013 limit US lethal actions to threats only to US persons.) Are you curious as to whether Reuters/AFP got this right, and the NYT missed its relevance? The official statement on the Yemeni Defense Ministry’s website identifies Bayda as the target.

[6] It is striking that in light of such a “massive and unprecedented” operation, there has not been more reporting on what exactly the militants were allegedly up to.
Yemen’s Interior Ministry said Monday that as many as 55 militants had been killed, but a senior Yemeni official put the figure in the 40s.[7][8] The government’s statement also acknowledged that three civilians had been killed and five wounded in one of the airstrikes on Saturday.

[7] It would be helpful to inform the reader that Yemeni official statements like these have in the past proven wrong after time passes following a strike.

[8] Such widely varying numbers should raise questions about the quality of the intelligence before (as well as after) the strikes. The poor quality of these numbers also raises questions about whether the US and Yemeni authorities were able to know — in advance — that no civilians were at risk of being killed. (This is important because President Obama’s new rules of May 23 permit lethal force only if there is “near certainty” that civilians “will not be injured or killed.”)
Yemeni officials said they were working to identify those killed[9] in the attacks. As part of a campaign using armed drones in Yemen, the United States has been trying to kill Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the head of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen, and Ibrahim al-Asiri, the group’s master bomb maker. But American officials said Monday that those men were not the intended targets in these strikes.[10]

[9] This phrase may mean the officials are certain that all the individuals killed were militants, and the government is simply working to determine their specific roles and identities. That said, the phrase also raises questions about the quality of intelligence before the strike. If the intelligence was lacking, how certain were the US and Yemeni governments that the targets were only militants and not also civilians? How certain were they that the militants were “leading elements” of AQAP, as Yemen’s government alleged?

[10] This is a major revelation. It contradicts rumors and speculation that Asiri was a target of the operations, and notably it contradicts an earlier report by the Long War Journal which concluded that he was a target.
The precise role of the United States in the airstrikes and ground operations was not immediately clear. American officials said the airstrikes had been carried out by drones operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, but an agency spokesman declined to comment. Other officials said American Special Operations military personnel had supported the Yemeni operations on the ground with intelligence and possibly logistical assistance.[11] The Pentagon declined to discuss the operations.

[11] This is also a major revelation. It also raises specific concerns about whether the US is now fighting a domestic insurgency alongside the Yemeni government. As with reports that the US military may pilot CIA drones, these operations in Yemen also show the need for a more nuanced understanding of the CIA’s vs. Pentagon’s roles in targeted strikes–more nuanced than common accounts otherwise suggest. This would be a fruitful area for investigation.
The White House press secretary, Jay Carney, referred all questions about the operations, which started on Saturday and continued past midnight on Sunday, to the Yemeni government,[12] and he spoke only in broad terms about the counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries.

[12] Might Carney’s statement involve an implicit form of endorsement of the Yemeni government’s representation of the facts?
“We have a strong collaborative relationship, as you know, with the Yemeni government and worked together on various initiatives to counter the shared threat we face from A.Q.A.P.,” said Mr. Carney, referring to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

American officials sought to play down the United States’ role and to allow Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Yemen’s president, to bolster his domestic credibility and claim credit for the operations.[13] They had a troubled relationship with the longtime president who preceded him, Ali Abdullah Saleh, but they have voiced confidence in Mr. Hadi and increased aid to the country.

[13] This statement is potentially more nefarious than first meets the eye. Recall the Wikileaks cable from General Petraeus’s meeting with Yemen’s then-President Saleh:

“‘We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours,’ Saleh said, prompting Deputy Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just ‘lied’ by telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa were American-made but deployed by the ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government].’”
The drone attacks were the largest barrage of airstrikes carried out in Yemen this year — 11 in all so far, according to The Long War Journal, a website that tracks drone strikes — and one of the largest strikes carried out since President Obama outlined a new strategy last May for targeting Qaeda militants in battlefields outside Afghanistan.

In his speech in May, Mr. Obama said targeted killing operations were carried out only against militants who posed a “continuing and imminent threat to the American people.” He also said no strike could be authorized without “near certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured,” a bar he described as “the highest standard we can set.”[14]

[14] Hallelujah! It is terrific to see a news report squarely raise these two questions. Despite significant media coverage of these strikes, to our knowledge, Schmitt’s piece was the first to do this so explicitly. The strike standards are set forth in a government document, “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities.” Only a summarized version of the document is publicly available. When the standards were released on May 23, 2013, we raised initial questions about their content and we expressed concerns about the continuing lack of transparency. It is important to raise those same questions and concerns in light of the events in Yemen and elsewhere.
Given that the administration would not even confirm that American drones carried out the strikes over the weekend, it was unclear how the people targeted in the strike posed a threat to Americans.[15] The Qaeda affiliate has in the past targeted the United States Embassy in Sana, the Yemeni capital.

[15] This is a very important assessment, and again raises a key question about the strikes. Given that it remains completely unanswered, it is precisely the kind of questioning that should appear in news reports. When the last significant series of strikes occurred in Yemen in July-August 2013, news reports routinely quoted from officials who claimed that al Qaeda was planning to attack US embassies. We are surprised that there has been so little reporting now about what specific threat these alleged militants posed to “US persons.” There may be sound reasons that justify the US assisting Yemen with attacks against threats to Yemeni installations or persons, but the US has been very clear that it will strike only if there is a threat to US persons.
The raid by Yemen’s Counterterrorism Unit late Sunday, which occurred on the main road connecting the southern province of Shabwa with the adjacent province of Marib, culminated nearly 48 hours of intensive airstrikes.

“The operation delivers a strong message to the criminal and terror operatives that the armed forces and security personnel are ready to foil and thwart terrorist acts in any time and place,” Mr. Hadi said in the government’s statement.

The statement said three airstrikes had destroyed al Qaeda training camp in a remote mountainous area in Abyan, a southern province, killing two dozen militants, including foreign fighters.

The government said several other airstrikes had targeted vehicles and militants in Abyan, Shabwa and Bayda Provinces.

Mohsen Labhas, a resident of Al Lahab, a village near a highway that connects the cities of Ataq and Bayhan in Shabwa Province, said that after hearing gunfire on Sunday night, he and other residents jumped in their cars and raced to the scene. They were met by American drones and helicopters.[16] “We abandoned our car since we thought that the aircraft might target us, but it turned out that it warned us from approaching the area,[17]” he said.

[16] The use of helicopters — manned, low-flying aircraft — is important in considering whether the US is now a party to an internal armed conflict in Yemen. Unlike drones, helicopters expose US forces to risk of casualties, which may implicate whether congressional authorization is required. (See also the reference above to the US providing support “on the ground with intelligence and possibly logistical assistance.”)

[17] Assuming the witness accurately understood these events, it is very positive to see reporting — in the context of targeted killings and drone strikes — on efforts taken by the US and Yemen to warn civilians, and to keep civilians away from areas of active fighting. We do not recall such efforts being reported in relation to previous strikes.
“Nearly half an hour later, the aircraft fired a missile at a target on the ground,” Mr. Labhas said.

A strike on Saturday morning targeted a vehicle in Bayda Province, killing 10 militants and wounding one, according to the Yemeni government. It said intelligence had indicated that the fighters were planning to attack important installations.

“Regrettably, three civilians were also killed during the attack and five were injured when their pickup truck unexpectedly appeared[18][19] next to the targeted vehicle,” the statement said.

[18] Given the central role that allegations of civilian deaths and injuries have played in targeted killing debates, we were surprised to see the details about this aspect of the operations so far down in the article. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it has been rare for officials to acknowledge so quickly that civilians were killed. This is a positive step, and we hope it signals a new approach to responding to civilian harm. Finally here, one news story can’t do everything, but it would be good to see some journalists now follow up this story to investigate whether the governments pay compensation to these victims and families, and whether there is any form of public acknowledgement to the families of these mistakes and an explanation of their family members’ deaths.

[19] The civilian vehicle “unexpectedly appeared”? This suggests an answer to earlier questions raised by some commentators about whether the civilians were killed simply by accident, or whether they were targeted on the mistaken assumption that they were al Qaeda. Yet the claim that the civilian vehicle unexpectedly appeared raises its own questions, particularly about what precautions are taken before attacks, how a “near certainty” standard is applied in practice, and whether the technical capacities drones have to enable precision targeting match the capabilities often claimed by officials.

Michael Lind on Christopher Hitchens…

Michael Lind on Christopher Hitchens…

Michael Lind writes a fine post in Salon on Christopher Hitchens, the roles ascribed to him in the US and the UK, and draws out some fine distinctions between public intellectuals, the attributes of scholarship and what much of our journalism and much of the blogosphere have come to think they represent.

At this time in the world, serious scholarship meeting high standards in its research and the logic of its conclusions is vital.

We also face the task of getting that serious work into the hands of decision makers who are willing to be moved by it.  To some extent the blogosphere seems to have been more successful getting it its work into the hands of those who will listen and follow than in doing the preliminary work to ensure the quality of what it puts forth.

Glenn Greenwald on why mosque debate is not a “distraction…amazing and unjustifiable

This is an excerpt from a longer piece that includes  a video you should watch to get a sense of  the intensity involved in this:  http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/08/23/park51/index.html

If Park51 ends up moving or if opponents otherwise succeed in defeating it, it will seriously bolster and validate the ugly premises at the heart of this campaign:  that Muslims generally are responsible for 9/11, Terrorism justifies and even compels our restricting the equals rights and access of Americans Muslims, and more broadly, the animosity and suspicions towards Muslims generally are justified, or at least deserving of respect.  As Aziz Poonawalla put it:  “if the project does fail, then I think that the message that will be sent is that bigotry and fear of Muslims is not just permitted, it is effective.”

That’s exactly the message that will be sent, and that’s what makes this conflict so significant.  Obviously, not all opponents of Park51 are as overtly hateful as those in that video — and not all opponents are themselves bigots — but the position they’ve adopted is inherently bigoted, as it seeks to impose guilt and blame on a large demographic group for the aberrational acts of a small number of individual members.   And one thing is certain:  if this campaign succeeds, it will proliferate and the sentiments driving it will become even more potent.  Hatemongers always become emboldened when they triumph.

The animosity and hatred so visible here extends far beyond the location of mosques or even how we treat American Muslims.  So many of our national abuses, crimes and other excesses of the last decade — torture, invasions, bombings, illegal surveillance, assassinations, renditions, disappearances, etc. etc. — are grounded in endless demonization of Muslims.  A citizenry will submit to such policies only if they are vested with sufficient fear of an Enemy.  There are, as always, a wide array of enemies capable of producing substantial fear (the Immigrants, the Gays, and, as that video reveals, the always-reliable racial minorities), but the leading Enemy over the last decade, in American political discourse, has been, and still is, the Muslim.

That’s why the population is willing to justify virtually anything that’s done to “them” without much resistance at all, and it’s why very few people demand evidence from the Government before believing accusations that someone is a Terrorist:  after all, if they’re Muslim, that’s reason enough to believe it.  Hence, the repeated, mindless mantra that those in Guantanamo — or those on the Government’s “hit list” — are Terrorists even in the absence of evidence and charges, and even in the presence of ample grounds for doubting the truth of those accusations.

And there’s no end in sight:  the current hysteria over Iran at its core relies — just as the identical campaign against Iraq did — on the demonization of a whole new host of Muslim villains.  A population that is constantly bombarded with tales of Muslim Evil (they want to kill your children and explode a nuclear suitcase in your neighborhood) will be filled with fear and hatred — sentiments always exacerbated during times of economic strife and uncertainty — and very well-primed to lash out.  That’s the decade-long brew that has led to this purely irrational, hate-driven demand that they not be allowed to desecrate and infect the Sacred, Hallowed Space of Ground Zero (the religious terminology used to talk about 9/11 is both creepy and no accident).  This “debate” over Park51 is many things.  An inconsequential “distraction” from what Really Matters is not one of them.

A worthy effort off to a bumbling start (?) How amateurism injures nonprofit sector credibility…

The New York Times carries a story this morning that reeks of well-intentioned amateurs (or totally disingenuous jerks) trying to start a national program which, if it could be done successfully, might be a worthy use of tax funds. Oddly enough, as one reads the defensive statements of the spokesperson, one has to notice that the idea of replicating processes of other grant-making government agencies, didn’t seem to occur to the people in charge of this new one, even though the purpose of this fund is to identify effective nonprofit programs that might be successfully replicated.

The people in charge of this program came to it from the nonprofit sector.  Now what they’ve done right out of the box will feed the largely destructive maw of Senator Grassley and do damage to the credibility of nonprofits.  Business men, always quick to offer solutions to nonprofits, will once more suggest the use of more business methods in a sector that can only adopt methods selectively if it is to carry out its mission.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/us/22nonprofit.html

I’m not the the only one…What It’s Like Inside the Head of a Reactant Person–HBR Research Blog

What It’s Like Inside the Head of a Reactant Person

9:58 AM Tuesday June 1, 2010
by Andrew O’Connell  | Comments (7View)

“When I was younger, I used to go to cocktail parties and listen to what people were talking about and deliberately insert myself into conversations to argue positions that I didn’t believe in but that seemed entertaining to advocate. Sometimes to the detriment of my friendships.”

This is Gavan Fitzsimons of Duke’s Fuqua school, speaking about trait reactance, an issue that’s central to his current research, vitally important to businesses — and personally important to him.

“The reason I got into studying reactance years ago as a doctoral student is that it’s an issue I struggle with — my family would say ‘suffer from,'” he says.

Reactance, a burgeoning field of social-psych study, refers to the backlash response to a perceived threat to freedom. You can provoke reactance a million ways: By limiting people’s choices, as Wal-Mart did when it wiped more than 300 familiar products off its shelves last year; by telling people that they have to pay a tax on tea, as the British Parliament did in 1773; and even by doling out expert advice, as countless climate-change activists have been doing (thus the recent finding that numerous people are rejecting the concept of global warming).

But not everyone responds to freedom threats with the same level of vehemence. The biggest backlash comes from people with high trait reactance, which is more or less a very sensitive you’re-trying-to-control-me internal meter. Highly reactant people do the opposite of what authority figures expect of them.

“One of the agreement-or-disagreement items in our kit for measuring trait reactance in research subjects is the statement ‘I find contradicting others stimulating,'” Fitzsimons says. “That’s classic trait reactance. And that’s me.”

People with high trait reactance boycott stores that annoy them. They dump tea in Boston Harbor. They stop believing climate-change experts. They also have a tendency to get themselves into trouble in organizations.

“Reactance can be costly for the individual, there’s no question,” Fitzsimons says. “But there are some real positives in an organization to having someone bristle against the path that everybody is following. If everyone is yea-saying, you really want a reactant person around to say ‘Hold on a second, this is ridiculous’ and push for considering alternatives.”

He adds: “Of course, if you have too many people saying that, it becomes problematic.”

One of the issues he’s planning to study is the impact of reactant people on teams. “Our speculation is that a mix of high-reactance and low-reactance people leads to better team outcomes. We hypothesize that an all-low-reactance team will converge too quickly on a consensus opinion, and an all-high team will battle too much. In fact, it’s quite possible that from a societal perspective, it’s good for populations to be a mixture of high- and low-reactance individuals.”

And it’s probably good for high-reactance people to marry low-reactance people. “Having two people who are both highly reactant seems like a recipe for disaster,” Fitzsimons says. He speaks from experience: His wife, he says, “has mastered the art of managing me.”

Andrew O’Connell is an editor with the Harvard Business Review Group.